Abstract. Affiliation-Hiding Authentication (AHA) protocols have the seemingly contradictory property of enabling users to authenticate each other as members of certain groups, without revealing their affiliation to group outsiders. Of particular interest in practice is the group-discovering variant, which handles multiple group memberships per user. Corresponding solutions were only recently introduced, and have two major drawbacks: high bandwidth consumption (typically several kilobits per user and affiliation), and only moderate performance in scenarios of practical application.
Introduction
In cryptography, Authenticated Key Establishment (AKE) protocols are an essential building block for creation of secure communication channels. Such schemes offer both the establishment of a strong session key and, simultaneously, mutual authentication of respective protocol partners. Usually, this authentication step is PKI-based and explicitly reveals to other users (including adversarial eavesdroppers) the identities and certificates of participants. This behavior can be considered a breach of users' privacy. To tackle this issue, Affiliation-Hiding Authentication (AHA) in form of Secret Handshakes (SH) [1, 2, 9, [15] [16] [17] [29] [30] [31] and key establishment protocols (AHA/KE) [13, 14, 19, 21, 22] emerged in the last decade.
Generally, in AHA protocols, users authenticate each other on basis of their affiliation to certain groups, and do so in a privacy-preserving manner: In the classical 'exact matching' approach [2, 9, 15, 17, [29] [30] [31] , the own affiliation is revealed to the protocol partner if and only if the protocol partner is member of the same group. Users become members of groups by registering with the respective group's authority (GA). On admission of a new user, GA generates a corresponding membership certificate and gives it to the user. This credential allows the user to authenticate itself to other group members in later so-called 'Handshake' sessions. We stress that the attempt to authenticate to non-members using such a group membership certificate not only fails, but in addition does not reveal any evidence or even hint about the group membership to given nonmember. This is the pivotal property in affiliation-hiding security.
The main difference between the notions of Secret Handshakes and AHA/KE protocols is that the former are pure authentication protocols, i.e. are limited to perform the affiliation-hiding authentication of users, while the latter also succeed in the generation of a secure session key that may be used to protect further communication and exchange of digital data. In particular, AHA/KE protocols guarantee the usual key security properties of AKE protocols [3, 8] (including forward secrecy, etc).
These properties make AHA/KE protocols very attractive in various settings where privacy-preserving communication is needed. Their deployment in practice, especially on resource constraint devices and networks, requires, however, further research on efficient solutions. As we elaborate in the next sections, current proposals have efficiency limitations and are, therefore, less suitable in a mobile setting. To overcome these limitations we propose a novel AHA/KE protocol that outperforms existing approaches and minimizes the consumed communication bandwidth.
Linkable vs. Unlinkable AHA
Affiliation-Hiding Authentication protocols are either linkable or unlinkable. In linkable schemes [2, 9, 13, 14] , users hold identities or have assigned pseudonyms which they actively reveal in protocol runs. Still, hiding of affiliations is considered valuable nonetheless, and remains an explicit security goal of those protocols. Linkable protocols are usually deployed in cases where participants are addressed by their identities anyway, e.g. in instant messaging, social networks, etc.
In unlinkable affiliation-hiding protocols [1, 15, 17, 31] , however, sessions of users cannot be linked back to them. Obviously, these schemes offer a higher level of privacy. The challenging part in their design is the support of revocation, i.e. exclusion of members from the group: even though users do not have explicit identities, the schemes must provide methods for their individual exclusion.
In practice, linkable AHA protocols enjoy very efficient revocation by blacklisting pseudonyms on public revocation lists, while unlinkable AHA protocols support revocation either by restricting the number of unlinkable sessions of users [31] , by regularly updating unrevoked membership credentials [15] , or by the considerably costly verification of revocation tokens [17] .
The Challenge of Group Discovery
Classical AHA schemes [1, 2, 9, 15, 17, [29] [30] [31] are mostly single-group protocols, i.e. it is assumed that the participating users are member of one group each, and the protocol execution checks whether these groups are identical or not. We argue, however, that this restriction to only one group may not be acceptable in practice. Consider, for instance, a social network where users are member of many, say n, groups. Now, when two participants of the network meet they may want to investigate in a privacy-preserving manner whether they have any group in common or not. If they used a classical AHA scheme, they would have to run n × n protocol instances in parallel to cover all possible combinations, spotting and reporting only the matching ones. This overhead is clearly unacceptable in practice for being inefficient, and justifies the need for special group-discovering (but still affiliation-hiding) protocols. The plurality of existing AHA schemes, however, ignores the group-discovery problem by design, and only two schemes, namely [16] and [19] , support deployment of credentials for multiple groups in a single protocol run.
For AHA protocols that support multiple credentials, we need to define what we consider a successful authentication. It seems that the most useful notion is the following: If both users provide credentials for various groups in a specific protocol execution, the authentication is considered successful if there is at least one group in common. Output of the protocol would be this indication and, optionally, a list of all matching groups.
Related Work
The Secret Handshakes in [2, 9, 30] are linkable protocols that have been designed for the main purpose of authentication. While some of them, additionally, offer the generation of a session key, security of the latter is neither formally analyzed nor does it reach an adequate level of security in practice. In contrast, the schemes from [14, 21, 22] incorporate a secure key establishment protocol that satisfies accepted models of key security [3, 8] . Group Secret Handshakes are presented by Jarecki et al. in [12, 13] , where the two-party setting is extended to multiparty authentication and key agreement. Both works achieve session group key establishment through a variant of the Burmester-Desmedt technique [7] . In [18, 21, 22] , the impact of corrupt GAs on users' privacy is explored. In particular, while Manulis et al. [21, 22] act conservatively and harden protocols to withstand GA attacks, Kawai [18] deviates from the traditional setting by splitting the GA's role among an issue authority and a tracing authority (that are assumed not to collude).
We remark that unlinkable AHA schemes can generically be obtained from linkable protocols by using one-time pseudonyms; however, this approach is clearly impractical for not being scalable. Due to this restriction, several unlinkable Secret Handshakes [1, 15, 17, 29] based on reusable credentials have been proposed. Here, the challenging part is revocation of protocol participants: Ateniese's protocol [1] does not support revocation at all, Jarecki [15] presents a protocol in which participants need to regularly contact the GA for an update of users' internal state, Tsudik [29] introduces a heavy-weight framework that involves the use of group signatures and broadcast encryption techniques, while the state-of-the-art scheme [17] by Jarecki et al. uses group signatures with verifier-local revocation for group management and private conditional oblivious transfer for the handshake session, in the pairing-based setting.
Exclusively the protocols in [16, 19] offer support for multiple credentials per user, i.e. they solve the problem of efficient group-discovery. Still, the scheme in [16] by Jarecki et al. has the somehow weird and unusual property that GAs are in the position to fully impersonate any user that is registered to them: First step of the registration process to a group is that user sends its complete private key material to the corresponding GA, which then computes the appropriate user credential from it. Manulis' scheme in [19] is a rather efficient RSA-based protocol with two exponentiations per user and group, and can be considered the state-of-the-art protocol for group-discovering AHA/KE.
In the efficiency analyses, both [16] and [19] distinguish between the so-called asymmetric and symmetric workload of their protocols. While the former reflects the amount of (expensive) public key operations like exponentiations and pairing computations, the latter covers the remaining (relatively cheap) parts, including block cipher and hash function evaluations. Claiming that protocols' efficiency can be adequately estimated by taking into account only their asymmetric overhead, [16] and [19] promote their schemes as O(n) protocols, where n is the number of group affiliations per user, although in both cases the real number of operations is O(n 2 ). Contradicting this reasoning, recent results in [20] reveal that, in practice, the symmetric overhead of [16, 19] may not be neglected and limits protocols' applicability. We stress that our new protocol presented in Section 3 offers real O(n log n) performance, counting all computations, while the asymmetric workload remains to be O(n), as in [16, 19] .
Contributions and Organization
The contribution of this work is the construction of a new and highly-efficient linkable group-discovering AHA/KE protocol that outclasses existing schemes [16, 19] in several aspects: First, our protocol is the first real O(n log n) solution (consisting of O(n) public key operations plus a simple sorting step in O(n log n)). Second, the protocol's bandwidth requirements are impressively low. Specifically, as we will show in Section 3.3, our protocol consumes only 4% of the bandwidth when compared to [19] .
We consider these improvements as a major step forward to make privacypreserving techniques deployable in practice. In particular, on mobile devices, which are usually restricted in at least computing power or available bandwidth, without our improvements, execution of AHA protocols would be hardly feasible.
As an application, we envision users managing and exploring their social network relationships through their mobile phones that form ad hoc wireless networks of constraint range. In these scenarios, privacy-preserving techniques are of highest importance.
We start our work by giving insight into our main building block, a NonInteractive Key Distribution Scheme (NIKDS), in Section 2. In Section 3 we present our new protocol, and discuss its efficiency and the selection of reasonable parameters for deployment in practice. We support the security of our protocol by giving a formal analysis in form of a model specification (Section 4) and proof of security (Section 5), in respect to this model.
Non-Interactive Key Distribution
In a multi-user setting, the purpose of a Non-Interactive Key Distribution Scheme (NIKDS) [5, 11, 23] is the assignment of a (fixed) symmetric key to each pair of users. The intrinsic property and advantage of NIKDS over (authenticated) key establishment protocols is that NIKDS are non-interactive, i.e. users can compute the particular keys shared with other users without any (prior) communication with them.
Typically, NIKDS are identity based schemes, i.e. users are 'addressed' by their identities, which may be arbitrary strings. In NIKDS, users first register their particular identity id ∈ {0, 1} * with an authority called Key Generation Center (KGC) to obtain their specific user credential sk [id] . With this credential they can compute, without any interaction, a key shared between id and id , for any other user identity id ∈ {0, 1} * . The notion of NIKDS and its security properties are formalized next. The following security property adopts the classical key indistinguishability requirements of interactive key agreement protocols [3] to the non-interactive setting. Note that in [11] an even stronger but less natural computational variant of this model is analyzed. 
Definition and Security Model of NIKDS
Exp ind-cia,b NIKDS,A (λ): -sk ← Setup(1 λ ) -(id, id , state) ← A Register(sk,·) 1 (1 λ ) -K 0 $ ← {0, 1} λ and K 1 ← SharedKey(sk; id, id ) -b ← A Register(sk,·) 2 (state, K b ) -output 0 if A queried Register(sk, id) or Register(sk, id ) to its oracle -else output b
A Construction of NIKDS Based on Bilinear Maps (Pairings)
The first efficient NIKDS was constructed in [23] and analyzed in [11] (although the notion of NIKDS was introduced to cryptography about 20 years earlier, in [25] ). The scheme is described as follows:
Specify cyclic groups G = g and G T of prime order q, for which an efficient non-degenerate bilinear pairingê : G × G → G T is known (see also [5, Chapter X]). In addition, specify hash functions H : {0, 1} * → G and H * : 
Security of this scheme was established in [11] as follows: [6] in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) [4] .
Theorem 1. NIKDS is IND-CIA secure under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption (BDH)

Our Affiliation-Hiding Authentication Protocol
In this section, we present our Affiliation-Hiding Authentication and Key Agreement protocol (AHA/KE). We kept the scheme's syntax consistent with [19] , where the first practical AHA in the multi-group setting is proposed. Still, we improve considerably on that protocol in both asymptotic computational performance and bandwidth consumption. In particular, while in both [19] and our protocol the number of public key operations is linear in the number of affiliations n, the remaining 'symmetric' workload of [19] is O(n 2 ), in contrast to O(n log n) in our protocol.
Syntax of AHA
An AHA scheme AHA = (CreateGroup, AddUser, Handshake, Revoke) consists of four efficient algorithms and protocols:
CreateGroup(1 λ ) : This algorithm is executed by a Group Authority (GA) to set up a new group G. On input security parameter 1 λ , a public/secret group key pair (G.pk, G.sk) is generated, the group's pseudonym revocation list G.prl is initialized to ∅, and public group parameters G.par = (G.pk, G.prl) 
Protocol Definition
We are ready to specify our new AHA protocol with implicit group discovery. As a major building block it uses a generic NIKDS. In particular, the scheme presented in Section 2 is suitable. Recall that the algorithms of NIKDS are denoted Setup, Register, and GetKey.
CreateGroup(1 λ ) Algorithm. To create a new group, the Group Authority (GA) sets up a new KGC of a NIKDS by running sk ← Setup(1 λ ). In addition, the group's pseudonym revocation list G.prl is emptied. This algorithm outputs G.par = (G.prl) and G.sk = sk. Note that a group's public key is not needed, and it hence is not specified.
AddUser(G, id) Algorithm.
A new user with pseudonym id is added to group G by registering id to the NIKDS's KGC: the user's private membership credential in group G will be sk G [id] ← Register(sk, id), where sk = G.sk.
Handshake(G)
Protocol. The specification of our Handshake protocol is given in Figure 1 . The protocol makes use of the following building blocks:
-To achieve forward security of the established session key, a standard DiffieHellman key exchange is incorporated into the protocol (cf. lines 1 and 3). Hence, we require existence of a cyclic group G = g of prime order q in which the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDH) is hard (in respect to security parameter λ).
* → {0, 1} , where = (λ) is polynomially dependent on security parameter λ, we denote a hash function. It will be modeled as random oracle in the security analysis of the protocol.
-By Sort(M), for a set M ⊆ {0, 1} of strings of length , we denote the lexicographic ordering of M. It is well-known that Sort( ) is an O(n log n) algorithm (e.g. 'Quicksort'), and that look-up in an ordered set is an O(log n) operation.
We briefly explain the design principles of the protocol from the point of view of user U i . For all groups G in which id i is registered (line 5) and in which id j is not revoked (line 6), the NIKDS key K G shared by id i and id j is computed (line 7) and used to derive two authentication tags c G,0 , c G,1 in lines 8 and 9 (that also will serve for key confirmation). One of the tags is sent to U j (line 12), while the other one is stored in state variable S i for later use (line 10). Note that U j computes the same tags for all groups that both U i and U j are member of. This intersection set (named groups) is determined in lines 13-16, by recording all matches of group-specific authentication tags. If U i and U j have at least one group in common (line 17), then the protocol accepts with a secure session key (lines 1, 3, and 18). Observe that the purpose of the sorting step (center of line 12) is not only to enable an O(log n) look-up of authentication tags in line 15, but also to hide the order in which these tags have been computed. This is an important prerequisite to make the protocol affiliation-hiding. Notice that the scheme is displayed as four-message protocol for reasons of better readability. By combining messages m j and Sort(M j ) into a single datagram, the scheme can be relieved by one message transmission. User Ui on input idi and Gi:
if idj ∈ G.prl:
if cG,1 ∈ Sort(Mj):
terminate with "accept" else terminate with "reject"
User Uj on input idj and Gj:
if cG,0 ∈ Sort(Mi):
terminate with "accept" else terminate with "reject" Revoke(G, id) Algorithm. By setting G.prl ← G.prl ∪ {id}, the group's pseudonym revocation list G.prl is extended by the new entry. The updated prl is distributed authentically to all group members.
Correctness, Efficiency, and Parameter Selection
Our AHA scheme is correct in the sense of Definition 3. This follows from correctness of deployed NIKDS and inspection of Figure 1 . Recall also the exposition of design rationale in Section 3.2. Asymptotically, the protocol is an O(n log n) protocol, where n = |G| denotes the number of groups per user. This is due to the fact that both the sorting step (line 12) and the tag-matching step (lines [14] [15] [16] are O(n log n) . However, the number of expensive public key operations (i.e. pairing evaluations in the NIKDS) is linear in the number of affiliations. More precisely: A user that deploys credentials for n groups has to compute n pairings to complete the protocol (or even less, when considering the possibility of revoked users). Note that the AHA schemes from [16] and [19] have O(n 2 ) workload of 'symmetric operations'. Although these can be considered rather fast in comparison to big-integer exponentiations or pairing evaluations, for large n (e.g. n 100), the quadratic overhead of [16, 19] will be clearly noticed [20] .
Especially in respect to bandwidth consumption, our protocol impressively outperforms state-of-the-art protocol [19] . In the latter, for being an RSA-based protocol, more than 4000 bits have to be sent and received per user, affiliation, and session. In our protocol, however, this number drops to about 160 bits (80 bits for each authentication tag), for a comparable level of security. Hence, our protocol consumes only 4% of the bandwidth, when compared to [19] .
For practical security, we suggest to use Diffie-Hellman and pairing groups of about 2 160 elements, authentication tags of length 80 bit (lines 8-9), and a 128 bit KDF for key derivation (line 18).
The selection of parameters for an efficient pairing suitable in practice will not be too complicated. Note that in NIKDS group elements are never transmitted from one party to the other. Hence, care does not have to be taken to find pairing-friendly curves with 'nice' element representations. Although, for reasons of convenience, only symmetric pairings were considered in Section 2 to build NIKDS, they can be built from asymmetric pairings as well [11] . At the time of writing this article, ηT -pairing evaluations on desktop machines in under 500 μs were feasible [26, 27] , i.e. for a user with about 100 affiliations 1 we estimate the total running time of a Handshake execution below 50 ms. Recall from Section 2 that in our NIKDS scheme the first input element to the pairing is always sk [id] , which can be considered a fixed long-term parameter. See [10, 24] for considerable optimizations on fixed-argument pairing evaluations. Finally note that all NIKDS computations are session-independent and can be cached: If the same two users run the Handshake protocol multiple times they can fall back to previously computed K G to considerably save computation time.
Security Model for AHA
In this section we present the security model for AHA protocols. It takes into account the challenges implied by the group discovery problem and bases on the current state-of-the-art model from [19] . Essentially, there exist two central security properties for AHA: Linkable Affiliation-Hiding security, and Authenticated Key Exchange security (with forward secrecy). Both requirements are defined with regard to multiple input groups per user and session. As the model for the latter goal is very similar to standard definitions of AKE security [3, 8] , and only minor modifications are necessary to fit the LAH setting, we abstain from giving a full description of the model in this article, and refer to [19] for a detailed exposition. In contrast, LAH security is a non-standard goal and was only recently modeled [19] . We describe it in full detail below.
Adversary Model
The adversary A is modeled as a PPT machine that interacts with protocol participants and can mount attacks via the following set of queries. 
Linkable Affiliation-Hiding Security
We now define the property of Linkable Affiliation-Hiding (LAH). At a high level, the goal here is to protect from disclosure of non-shared affiliations to handshake partners. We model LAH-security using the indistinguishability approach (similar to that used for encryption schemes). The goal of the adversary is to decide which of two sets of affiliations, G * 0 or G * 1 , some challenge session π * is running on. The adversary specifies these sets himself, and, additionally, is allowed to invoke any number of handshake sessions, and ask Reveal and Corrupt queries at will. This intuition is formalized as follows. 
Definition 4 (LAH-Security
Security Analysis of Our Protocol
Following the definitions in Section 4, we claim that our AHA protocol from Section 3 satisfies the desired security goals.
Theorem 2 (Linkable Affiliation-Hiding Security).
The AHA protocol presented in Section 3.2 is LAH-secure in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) [4] , given that NIKDS is IND-CIA secure.
Proof (Sketch). We prove LAH security of our AHA protocol by using the 'gamehopping' technique, i.e. by presenting a sequence of games that are 'neighborwise' computationally indistinguishable from adversary's point of view. The first game, G 0,b , is identical with Exp lah,b AHA,A (λ, n, m). Let G 1,b denote the game that is identical with G 0,b , except that the challenger, before even starting the simulation, makes guesses for A's (future) choice of attacked identity id * and protocol partner π * .partner. The simulation is aborted if these guesses are not consistent with adversary's actions, i.e. with probability at most 1/n 2 , as n denotes the number of simulated users. As we abstained from formally defining AKE-security in Section 4, we here only give a qualitative result about key security of our protocol. We refer the interested reader to [19] for the state-of-the-art key security model that considers the affiliation-hiding setting. The proof given for the protocol of [19] can easily be adapted to fit our new scheme.
Theorem 3 (Authenticated Key Exchange Security).
The AHA protocol presented in Section 3.2 is AKE-secure [19] under the CDH assumption in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) [4] , given that NIKDS is IND-CIA secure.
Conclusion
We gave a construction of a new and impressively efficient Affiliation-Hiding Authentication scheme with included Key Establishment (AHA/KE). Its asymptotic computational performance of O(n log n) compares very favorably to O(n 2 ) of its predecessors [16, 19] . The same holds for bandwidth consumption, which amounts to only 4% of that of [19] . Still, the protocol's syntax and security properties remain in consistency with accepted security notions for AHA [19] .
We consider this work crucial in respect to deployment of privacy-preserving techniques in devices with limited resources, such as mobile phones in ad hoc wireless networks. Without the improvements described in the preceding sections, implementations of AHA protocols would hardly run at acceptable speed on such equipment.
